Benefits from Private Antitrust Enforcement: An Analysis of Forty Cases

41 Pages Posted: 11 Feb 2008 Last revised: 27 Apr 2010

Robert H. Lande

University of Baltimore - School of Law

Joshua P. Davis

University of San Francisco - School of Law

Date Written: 2008

Abstract

The goal of this Report is to take a first step toward providing an empirical basis for assessing whether private enforcement of the antitrust laws is serving its intended purposes and is in the public interest. To do this the Report assembles, aggregates, and analyzes information about forty of the largest recent successful private antitrust cases. This information includes, inter alia, the amount of money each action recovered, what proportion of the money was recovered from foreign entities, whether the private litigation was preceded by government action, the attorneys' fees awarded to plaintiffs' counsel, on whose behalf money was recovered (direct purchasers, indirect purchasers, or a competitor), and the kind of claim the plaintiffs asserted (rule of reason, per se, or a combination of the two). The article also compares the amounts collected from all antitrust violations together, and also from cases that also resulted in criminal penalties, to the total of all criminal antitrust fines imposed during the same period by the U.S. Department of Justice. This information is then used to help formulate policy conclusions about the desirability and efficacy of private enforcement of the antitrust laws.

Keywords: antitrust law, private enforcement, empirical research

Suggested Citation

Lande, Robert H. and Davis, Joshua P., Benefits from Private Antitrust Enforcement: An Analysis of Forty Cases (2008). University of San Francisco Law Review, Vol. 42, p. 879, 2008; Univ. of San Francisco Law Research Paper No. 2010-07. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1090661

Robert H. Lande

University of Baltimore - School of Law ( email )

1420 N. Charles Street
Baltimore, MD 21218
United States

Josh Paul Davis (Contact Author)

University of San Francisco - School of Law ( email )

2130 Fulton Street
San Francisco, CA 94117
United States

Paper statistics

Downloads
1,403
Rank
9,981
Abstract Views
5,375