On the Dynamics and Severity of Bank Runs: An Experimental Study

36 Pages Posted: 6 Feb 2008 Last revised: 28 Dec 2012

Andrew Schotter

New York University (NYU) - Department of Economics

Tanju Yorulmazer

University of Amsterdam - Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB)

Date Written: March 31, 2008

Abstract

This paper presents an experimental investigation of the factors that affect the dynamics and severity of bank runs. Our experiments demonstrate that the more information laboratory economic agents can expect to learn about the crisis as it develops, the more willing they are to restrain themselves from withdrawing their funds once a crisis occurs. Furthermore, our results indicate that the presence of insiders, who know the quality of the bank, significantly affects the dynamics of bank runs and helps mitigate their severity. We also show that deposit insurance, even of a limited type, can help diminish the severity of bank runs.

Keywords: Bank runs, Banking crises, Informed depositors, Deposit insurance, Experiments

JEL Classification: C91, C70, G21

Suggested Citation

Schotter, Andrew and Yorulmazer, Tanju, On the Dynamics and Severity of Bank Runs: An Experimental Study (March 31, 2008). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1090938 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1090938

Andrew Schotter

New York University (NYU) - Department of Economics ( email )

269 Mercer Street, 7th Floor
New York, NY 10011
United States
212-998-8909 (Phone)
212-995-4186 (Fax)

Tanju Yorulmazer (Contact Author)

University of Amsterdam - Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB) ( email )

Roetersstraat 11
Amsterdam, 1018 WB
Netherlands

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