Decentralization's Effects on Educational Outcomes in Bolivia and Colombia

50 Pages Posted: 12 Feb 2008

See all articles by Jean-Paul Faguet

Jean-Paul Faguet

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Centre for Economic Performance (CEP)

Fabio Sánchez

Universidad de los Andes, Colombia - Department of Economics

Date Written: June 15, 2007

Abstract

The effects of decentralization on public sector outputs is much debated but little agreed upon. This paper compares the remarkable case of Bolivia with the more complex case of Colombia to explore decentralization's effects on public education outcomes. In Colombia, decentralization of education finance improved enrollment rates in public schools. In Bolivia, decentralization made government more responsive by re-directing public investment to areas of greatest need. In both countries, investment shifted from infrastructure to primary social services. In both, it was the behavior of smaller, poorer, more rural municipalities that drove these changes. A key innovation of this paper is a methodology for estimating the effects of decentralization in a data-poor environment.

Keywords: decentralization, education, public investment, Bolivia, Colombia, local government

JEL Classification: D72, D73, H41, H42, H72, O18

Suggested Citation

Faguet, Jean-Paul and Sánchez Torres, Fabio, Decentralization's Effects on Educational Outcomes in Bolivia and Colombia (June 15, 2007). World Development, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1091097

Jean-Paul Faguet (Contact Author)

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Centre for Economic Performance (CEP) ( email )

Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
+44 207 955 6435 (Phone)
+44 207 955 6844 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/destin/faguetjp.html

Fabio Sánchez Torres

Universidad de los Andes, Colombia - Department of Economics ( email )

Carrera 1a No. 18A-10
Santafe de Bogota, AA4976
Colombia
+57 1 332 4495 (Phone)
+57 1 332 4492 (Fax)

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