Trending Economic Factors and the Structure of Congress in the Growth Of Government, 1930-2002

54 Pages Posted: 13 Feb 2008 Last revised: 21 Feb 2008

See all articles by Stanley L. Winer

Stanley L. Winer

Carleton University - School of Public Policy and Administration; Carleton University-Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Michael Tofias

University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee - Department of Political Science

Bernard Grofman

University of California, Irvine

John Aldrich

Duke University - Department of Political Science

Abstract

We investigate the role of Congress in the growth of federal public expenditure since 1930, building on the work of Kau and Rubin (Public Choice, 113:389-402). The model incorporates majority party strength and the extent of party control of Congress in addition to the median ideological position of elected representatives. We first provide estimates of the relative importance of the state of Congress and of trending supply and demand-side economic factors in the evolution of federal spending. The resulting models are then used to simulate the consequences of the radical and historically unprecedented shift to the right of Congress in 1994/95.

Keywords: Public expenditure, Congress, Ideology, Majority party strength, Party control

JEL Classification: H1, H3, H5, H6

Suggested Citation

Winer, Stanley L. and Tofias, Michael and Grofman, Bernard and Aldrich, John, Trending Economic Factors and the Structure of Congress in the Growth Of Government, 1930-2002. Public Choice, Vol. 113, pp. 389-402, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1091274

Stanley L. Winer (Contact Author)

Carleton University - School of Public Policy and Administration ( email )

1125 Colonel By Drive
Ottawa, Ontario K1S5B6
Canada
613-224-1274 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.carleton.ca/winer

Carleton University-Department of Economics ( email )

1125 Colonel By Drive
Ottawa, Ontario K1S5B6
Canada
613-224-1274 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.carleton.ca/winer

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Michael Tofias

University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee - Department of Political Science ( email )

PO Box 413
Milwaukee, WI 53211
United States

Bernard Grofman

University of California, Irvine ( email )

School of Social Sciences
SSPB 2291
Irvine, CA 92697
United States
19497331094 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.socsci.uci.edu/~bgrofman/

John Aldrich

Duke University - Department of Political Science ( email )

140 Science Drive (Gross Hall), 2nd floor
Duke University Mailcode: 90204
Durham, NC 27708-0204
United States
919-660-4346 (Phone)

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