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Market Concentration in the Antitrust Analysis of Horizontal Mergers

Jonathan B. Baker

American University - Washington College of Law

July 20, 2010

This handbook chapter appears in Antitrust Law & Economics (Keith Hylton, ed. 2010). It describes the role of market concentration in the legal framework for the antitrust review of horizontal mergers and evaluates the extent to which modern economic analysis supports a role for concentration in that review. The chapter examines market definition, the predicate for measuring market shares and market concentration, and the role of market shares and concentration in the analysis of the coordinated and unilateral competitive effects of merger. The central issue considered is when and how market shares, and market concentration statistics derived from them, form an appropriate basis for presuming harm to competition from merger. This revision corrects an error in the published chapter.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 29

Keywords: antitrust, mergers, concentration

JEL Classification: K22, L4

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Date posted: February 13, 2008 ; Last revised: July 22, 2010

Suggested Citation

Baker, Jonathan B., Market Concentration in the Antitrust Analysis of Horizontal Mergers (July 20, 2010). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1092248 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1092248

Contact Information

Jonathan B. Baker (Contact Author)
American University - Washington College of Law ( email )
4300 Nebraska Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20016
United States
202-274-4315 (Phone)
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