The Failure of U.S. Organ Procurement Policy

9 Pages Posted: 13 Feb 2008

See all articles by Thomas Randolph Beard

Thomas Randolph Beard

Auburn University - Department of Economics

John D. Jackson

Auburn University - Department of Economics

David L. Kaserman

Auburn University, College of Business, Department of Economics (Deceased)

Abstract

In this article, we calculate how many lives will be lost if the United States continues to prohibit the use of financial incentives to motivate organ donation. We do this to motivate policymakers to stop implementing alternative policy proposals that have little effect on the supply of organs but that temporarily quiet the outcry for resolving the transplant organ shortage.

Keywords: organ transplant, organ donation, policy, legislation, organ procurement, waiting lists, mortality, financial incentives, altruistic donation, demand, organ shortage, cadaveric organ donation

JEL Classification: I18, I11

Suggested Citation

Beard, Thomas Randolph and Jackson, John Douglas and Kaserman, David L., The Failure of U.S. Organ Procurement Policy. Regulation, Vol. 30, No. 4, Winter 2007-2008. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1092920

Cato Institute (Contact Author)

Cato Institute ( email )

1000 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20001-5403
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Thomas Randolph Beard

Auburn University - Department of Economics ( email )

415 W. Magnolia
Auburn, AL 36849-5242
United States

John Douglas Jackson

Auburn University - Department of Economics ( email )

415 W. Magnolia
Auburn, AL 36849-5242
United States

David L. Kaserman

Auburn University, College of Business, Department of Economics (Deceased)

N/A

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