'Unfair' Dispute Resolution Clauses: Much Ado About Nothing?

NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 08-08

BOILERPLATE: FOUNDATIONS OF MARKET CONTRACTS, Omri Ben-Shahar, ed., Cambridge University Press, 2007

29 Pages Posted: 17 Feb 2008  

Florencia Marotta-Wurgler

New York University School of Law

Abstract

Dispute resolution clauses are a common and potentially important component of many types of standard form contracts. I examine the use of dispute resolution clauses in 597 end-user license agreements (EULAs) of software packages sold online. I find that 75% of EULAs include choice of law clauses, 28% include forum selection clauses, 6% include arbitration clauses, and none include class action waivers. Sellers are equally likely to include dispute resolution clauses in the EULAs of consumer-oriented and business-oriented products. Despite the concerns of some legal academics, I do not find much evidence of "strategic" use of DRCs to advantage sellers over buyers. For example, sellers located in states with "seller-friendly" laws are no more likely to include choice of law or choice of forum clauses than sellers in states with stronger consumer protections; despite UCITA's flexible choice-of-law rules and otherwise seller-friendly provisions, sellers do not go out of their way to select UCITA; and, there is no evidence that fora selected are intentionally inconvenient to buyers. These results question certain proposals to regulate dispute resolution clauses in consumer form contracts on the basis of strategic behavior by sellers.

Suggested Citation

Marotta-Wurgler, Florencia, 'Unfair' Dispute Resolution Clauses: Much Ado About Nothing?. NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 08-08; BOILERPLATE: FOUNDATIONS OF MARKET CONTRACTS, Omri Ben-Shahar, ed., Cambridge University Press, 2007. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1093293

Florencia Marotta-Wurgler (Contact Author)

New York University School of Law ( email )

40 Washington Square South
New York, NY 10012-1099
United States

HOME PAGE: http://its.law.nyu.edu/facultyprofiles/profile.cfm?personID=27875

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