Dynamic Incorporation of Foreign Law

72 Pages Posted: 15 Feb 2008

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: February 12, 2008

Abstract

Lawmaking bodies in one polity sometimes incorporate the law of another polity "dynamically," so that when the law of the foreign jurisdiction changes, the law of the incorporating jurisdiction changes automatically. Dynamic incorporation can save lawmaking costs, lead to better legal rules and standards, and solve collective action problems. Thus, the phenomenon is widespread. However, dynamic incorporation delegates lawmaking power. Further, as the formal and practical barriers to revocation of the act of dynamic incorporation become higher, that act comes closer to a cession of sovereignty, and for democratic polities, such sessions entail a democratic loss. Accordingly, dynamic incorporation of foreign law has proven controversial both within federal systems and at the international level. The problem is most acute when nation-states agree to delegate lawmaking power to a supra-national entity. In order to gain the reciprocal benefits of cooperation and coordination, the delegation must be functionally irrevocable or nearly so. Representation of the member nation-states within the decision-making structures of the supra-national entity can ameliorate but cannot fully compensate for the resulting democracy losses suffered by those nation-states. More broadly, the benefits of dynamic incorporation must always be balanced against its costs, including the cost to self-governance.

Suggested Citation

Dorf, Michael C., Dynamic Incorporation of Foreign Law (February 12, 2008). Columbia Public Law Research Paper No. 08-163. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1093323 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1093323

Michael C. Dorf (Contact Author)

Cornell Law School ( email )

Myron Taylor Hall
Cornell University
Ithaca, NY 14853-4901
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/faculty/bio.cfm?id=333

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