Cores and Stable Sets for Interval-Valued Games

CentER Discussion Paper No. 2008-17

15 Pages Posted: 19 Feb 2008

See all articles by Sirma Zeynep Alparslan-Gok

Sirma Zeynep Alparslan-Gok

Suleyman Demirel University

Rodica Branzei

'A.l. Cuza' University of Iasi, Romania - Faculty of Computer Sciences

Stef H. Tijs

Tilburg University - Center For Economic Research; Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research; Università degli Studi di Genova - Dipartimento di Matematica

Date Written: February 2008

Abstract

In this paper, interval-type solution concepts for interval-valued cooperative games like the interval core, the interval dominance core and stable sets are introduced and studied. The notion of I-balancedness is introduced, and it is proved that the interval core of an interval-valued cooperative game is nonempty if and only if the game is I-balanced. Relations between the interval core, the dominance core and stable sets of an interval-valued game are established.

Keywords: cooperative games, interval games, the core, the dominance core, stable sets

JEL Classification: C71

Suggested Citation

Alparslan-Gok, Sirma Zeynep and Branzei, Rodica and Tijs, Stef H., Cores and Stable Sets for Interval-Valued Games (February 2008). CentER Discussion Paper No. 2008-17, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1094653 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1094653

Sirma Zeynep Alparslan-Gok (Contact Author)

Suleyman Demirel University ( email )

Suleyman Demirel University, Faculty of Arts and
Sciences, Mathematics Department
Isparta, 32260
Turkey
902462114282 (Phone)

Rodica Branzei

'A.l. Cuza' University of Iasi, Romania - Faculty of Computer Sciences ( email )

Carol I Blvd, Nr.11
Iasi
Romania

Stef H. Tijs

Tilburg University - Center For Economic Research ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
B925
5000 LE Tilburg
Netherlands
+31 13 466 2348 (Phone)

Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research ( email )

Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Università degli Studi di Genova - Dipartimento di Matematica

Via Dodecaneso 35
16146 Genoa
Italy

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