Investor Protection and the Mode of Acquisition: Implications for Ownership Dilution and Formation of Pyramids

53 Pages Posted: 20 Feb 2008 Last revised: 5 May 2011

See all articles by Woojin Kim

Woojin Kim

Seoul National University - Business School

Date Written: May 4, 2011

Abstract

This paper examines the influence of investor protection on the form of M&A transaction and its subsequent impact on ownership dilution and creation of corporate pyramids. In a large sample of acquisitions around the world, I find that (stock-based) mergers are more likely in countries with good investor protection, while (cash-based) control transactions are more prevalent in countries with low investor protection. Repeated acquisitions in common law countries results in substantial dilution of proportional ownership especially in U.S. but not in civil law countries. In contrast, series of acquisitions in civil law countries linked through firms that are bidders in one acquisition but targets in another tend to generate a corresponding series of inter-corporate control links, while this correspondence is much weaker in common law countries. These results suggest that differences in acquisition modes could be one potential channel through which investor protection affects corporate control structures around the world.

Keywords: pyramid, acquisition, investor protection, control block

JEL Classification: G34

Suggested Citation

Kim, Woojin, Investor Protection and the Mode of Acquisition: Implications for Ownership Dilution and Formation of Pyramids (May 4, 2011). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1095669 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1095669

Woojin Kim (Contact Author)

Seoul National University - Business School ( email )

1 Gwanak-ro, Gwanak-gu
Seoul, 08826
Korea, Republic of (South Korea)
82-2-880-5831 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://cba.snu.ac.kr/en/faculty?mode=view&memberidx=60582&major=6

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