39 Pages Posted: 20 Feb 2008 Last revised: 8 Apr 2016
Date Written: November 29, 2009
We study the impact of social networks on agents’ ability to gather superior information about firms. Exploiting novel data on the educational backgrounds of sell side equity analysts and senior officers of firms, we test the hypothesis that analysts’ school ties to senior officers impart comparative information advantages in the production of analyst research. We find evidence that analysts outperform on their stock recommendations when they have an educational link to the company. A simple portfolio strategy of going long the buy recommendations with school ties and going short buy recommendations without ties earns returns of 6.60% per year. We test whether Regulation FD, targeted at impeding selective disclosure, constrained the use of direct access to senior management. We find a large effect: pre-Reg FD the return premium from school ties was 9.36% per year, while post-Reg FD the return premium is nearly zero and insignificant. In contrast, in an environment that did not change selective disclosure regulation (the UK), the analyst school-tie premium has remained large and significant over the entire sample period.
The appendix to "Sell Side School Ties" may be found at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2758824.
Keywords: Social networks, connections, analysts, directors
JEL Classification: G10, G11, G14
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Cohen, Lauren and Frazzini, Andrea and Malloy, Christopher J., Sell Side School Ties (November 29, 2009). Harvard Business School Finance Working Paper No. 08-074. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1095808 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1095808