Liquidity and Returns to Target Shareholders in the Market for Corporate Control: Evidence from the U.S. Markets

Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, Forthcoming

49 Pages Posted: 25 Mar 2008 Last revised: 28 Nov 2012

See all articles by Kaun Y. Lee

Kaun Y. Lee

Chung-Ang University

Kee H. Chung

State University of New York at Buffalo - School of Management

Date Written: November 27, 2012

Abstract

In this paper we analyze how stock market liquidity affects the abnormal return to target firms in mergers and tender offers. We predict that target firms with poorer stock market liquidity receive larger announcement day abnormal returns based on the following considerations. First, target firms with poorer stock market liquidity receive greater liquidity improvements after a merger or tender offer. Second, deals that involve less liquid targets are less anticipated and/or more likely to be completed. Third, less liquid stocks have more diverse reservation prices across shareholders and thus require a higher takeover return. Consistent with these expectations, we show that abnormal returns to target firms’ shareholders are significantly and positively related to the difference in liquidity (measured by the bid-ask spread) between acquirers and targets as well as the magnitude of target firms’ liquidity improvement.

Keywords: Mergers, Tender offers, Bid-ask spread, Liquidity premium, Abnormal returns

JEL Classification: G14, G34

Suggested Citation

Lee, Kaun Young and Chung, Kee H., Liquidity and Returns to Target Shareholders in the Market for Corporate Control: Evidence from the U.S. Markets (November 27, 2012). Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1095832 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1095832

Kaun Young Lee (Contact Author)

Chung-Ang University ( email )

221 Hukseuk-Dong
Seoul 156-756
Korea
82-2-820-5892 (Phone)

Kee H. Chung

State University of New York at Buffalo - School of Management ( email )

Buffalo, NY 14260
United States
716-645-3262 (Phone)
716-645-3823 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://mgt.buffalo.edu/faculty/academic-departments/finance/faculty/kee-chung.html

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