College Admissions and the Role of Information: An Experimental Study

29 Pages Posted: 21 Feb 2008

See all articles by Agnes Pinter

Agnes Pinter

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Department of Economics

Robert Ferec Veszteg

University of the Basque Country

Joana Pais

Universidade de Lisboa, School of Economics and Management and UECE -- Research Unit on Complexity in Economics

Date Written: February 14, 2008

Abstract

We analyze two well-known matching mechanisms - the Gale-Shapley, and the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanisms - in the experimental lab in three different informational settings, and study the role of information in individual decision making. Our results suggest that - in line with the theory - in the college admissions model the Gale-Shapley mechanism outperforms the TTC mechanisms in terms of efficiency and stability, and it is as successful as the TTC mechanism regarding the proportion of truthful preference revelation. In addition, we find that information has an important effect on truthful behavior and stability. Nevertheless, regarding efficiency, the Gale-Shapley mechanism is less sensitive to the amount of information participants hold.

Keywords: experiments, information, matching

JEL Classification: C78, C91, D82

Suggested Citation

Pinter, Agnes and Veszteg, Robert Ferec and Pais, Joana, College Admissions and the Role of Information: An Experimental Study (February 14, 2008). ISER Discussion Paper No. 707, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1096034 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1096034

Agnes Pinter

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Department of Economics ( email )

Calle Madrid 126
Getafe, 28903
Spain

Robert Ferec Veszteg (Contact Author)

University of the Basque Country ( email )

Barrio Sarriena s/n
Leioa, Bizkaia 48940
Spain

Joana Pais

Universidade de Lisboa, School of Economics and Management and UECE -- Research Unit on Complexity in Economics ( email )

Rua do Quelhas 6
Lisboa, 1200-781
Portugal

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