Risks at Work: The Demand and Supply Sides of Government Redistribution

Posted: 29 Feb 2008

See all articles by Thomas R. Cusack

Thomas R. Cusack

Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)

Torben Iversen

Harvard University

Philipp Rehm

Ohio State University (OSU) - Department of Political Science

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: 2006

Abstract

To comprehend how the welfare state adjusts to economic shocks it is important to get a handle on both the genesis of popular preferences and the institutional incentives for governments to respond to these preferences. This paper attempts to do both, using a general theoretical framework and detailed data at both the individual and national levels. In a first step, we focus on how risk exposure and income are related to preferences for redistribution. To test our hypotheses, we extract detailed risk-exposure measures from labour-force surveys and marry them to cross-national opinion survey data. Results from analysis of these data attest to the great importance of risks within the labour market in shaping popular preferences for redistributive efforts by governments. In a second step, we turn our attention to the supply side of government redistribution. Institutions, we argue, mediate governments' reactions to redistributional demands following economic shocks. Using time-series cross-country data, we demonstrate how national training systems, and electoral institutions, as well as partisanship, shape government responses.

Suggested Citation

Cusack, Thomas R. and Iversen, Torben and Rehm, Philipp, Risks at Work: The Demand and Supply Sides of Government Redistribution ( 2006). Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 22, Issue 3, pp. 365-389, 2006, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1096838 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grj022

Thomas R. Cusack (Contact Author)

Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB) ( email )

Institution, States, and Markets Working Group
Reichpietschufer 50
D-10785 Berlin
Germany

Torben Iversen

Harvard University ( email )

Institute for Quantitative Social Science
1737 Cambridge Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-384-5847 (Phone)
617-496-5149 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~iversen/index.htm

Philipp Rehm

Ohio State University (OSU) - Department of Political Science ( email )

Columbus, OH 43210
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
546
PlumX Metrics