Job Protection: The Macho Hypothesis

Posted: 29 Feb 2008

See all articles by Yann Algan

Yann Algan

Universite Paris I Pantheon-Sorbonne - CNRS-EUREQUA; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Pierre Cahuc

National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) - National School for Statistical and Economic Administration (ENSAE); Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne - Equipe Universitaire de Recherche en Economie Quantitative (EUREQUA); University of Angers - French National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: 2006

Abstract

This paper shows that the stringency of employment protection in Mediterranean countries can be partly explained by cultural values embedded in religion. Both the security provided by this legislation and its redistributive effects in favour of the male breadwinner insiders fit into the framework of Mediterranean religions. First, international individual surveys allow us to document that Catholics and Muslims are more likely to agree with traditional gender division of work than Protestants and the non-religious. Second, we develop a political economy model predicting that employment protection should be more stringent in countries where there is a larger share of insiders supportive of traditional family values. We then show that this prediction is supported by empirical evidence on OECD countries over the period 1970-99.

Suggested Citation

Algan, Yann and Cahuc, Pierre, Job Protection: The Macho Hypothesis ( 2006). Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 22, Issue 3, pp. 390-410, 2006. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1096839 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grj023

Yann Algan (Contact Author)

Universite Paris I Pantheon-Sorbonne - CNRS-EUREQUA ( email )

106-112 Boulevard de l'Hopital
Paris Cedex 13, 75647
France

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Pierre Cahuc

National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) - National School for Statistical and Economic Administration (ENSAE) ( email )

92245 Malakoff Cedex
France

Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne - Equipe Universitaire de Recherche en Economie Quantitative (EUREQUA) ( email )

106-112 Boulevard de l'Hopital
Paris Cedex 13, 75647
France
+33 1 4117 3717 (Phone)
+33 1 4117 3724 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://eurequa.univ-paris1.fr/membres/cahuc/

University of Angers - French National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS)

106-112 Boulevard de l'Hopital
75647 Paris Cedex 13
France
+33 4 44 07 82 06 (Phone)
+33 4 44 07 82 02 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

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