The Separateness of Persons and Liberal Theory
Journal of Value Inquiry, Vol. 42, No. 2, pp. 147-165, June 2008
19 Pages Posted: 26 Feb 2008 Last revised: 25 Jul 2010
The fact that persons are separate in some descriptive sense is relatively uncontroversial. But one of the distinctive ideas of contemporary liberal political philosophy is that the descriptive fact of our separateness is normatively momentous. John Rawls and Robert Nozick both take the separateness of persons to provide a foundation for their rejection of utilitarianism and for their own positive political theories. So why do their respective versions of liberalism look so different? This paper claims that the difference is based in Rawls' and Nozick's differing understandings of the morally significant aspects of personhood, and argues that respect for separateness is a value better suited to defend Nozickian libertarianism than Rawlsian liberalism.
Keywords: Separateness of Persons, John Rawls, Robert Nozick, Liberalism, Libertarianism, Egalitarianism, Respect, Utilitarianism, Contractarianism
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