Power Over Prosecutors Corrupts Politicians: Cross Country Evidence Using a New Indicator
38 Pages
Posted: 4 Mar 2008
University of St. Gallen - Law Department; Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Walter Eucken Institute; University of Freiburg - College of Economics and Behavioral Sciences; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)
University of Hamburg - Institute of Law & Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)
Date Written: March 2008
Abstract
It is hypothesized that prosecution agencies that are dependent on the executive have less incentives to prosecute crimes committed by government members which, in turn, increases their incentives to commit such crimes. Here, this hypothesis is put to an empirical test focusing on a particular kind of crime, namely corruption. In order to test it, it was necessary to create an indicator measuring de jure as well as de facto independence of the prosecution agencies. The regressions show that de facto independence of prosecution agencies robustly reduces corruption of officials.
Keywords: Corruption, Prosecution Agencies, Judicial Independence, Prosecutorial Independence
JEL Classification: H11, K40, K42
Suggested Citation:
Suggested Citation
van Aaken, Anne and Feld, Lars P. and Voigt, Stefan, Power Over Prosecutors Corrupts Politicians: Cross Country Evidence Using a New Indicator (March 2008). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 2245; MACIE Discussion Paper No. 0208; U. of St. Gallen Law & Economics Working Paper No. 2008-06. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1097675
