Power Over Prosecutors Corrupts Politicians: Cross Country Evidence Using a New Indicator
CESifo Working Paper Series No. 2245
MACIE Discussion Paper No. 0208
38 Pages Posted: 4 Mar 2008
Date Written: March 2008
Abstract
It is hypothesized that prosecution agencies that are dependent on the executive have less incentives to prosecute crimes committed by government members which, in turn, increases their incentives to commit such crimes. Here, this hypothesis is put to an empirical test focusing on a particular kind of crime, namely corruption. In order to test it, it was necessary to create an indicator measuring de jure as well as de facto independence of the prosecution agencies. The regressions show that de facto independence of prosecution agencies robustly reduces corruption of officials.
Keywords: Corruption, Prosecution Agencies, Judicial Independence, Prosecutorial Independence
JEL Classification: H11, K40, K42
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ( email )
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CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)
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Munich, DE-81679
Germany
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
