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Power Over Prosecutors Corrupts Politicians: Cross Country Evidence Using a New Indicator

38 Pages Posted: 4 Mar 2008  

Anne van Aaken

University of St. Gallen - Law Department; Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Lars P. Feld

Walter Eucken Institute; University of Freiburg - College of Economics and Behavioral Sciences; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Stefan Voigt

University of Hamburg - Institute of Law & Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: March 2008

Abstract

It is hypothesized that prosecution agencies that are dependent on the executive have less incentives to prosecute crimes committed by government members which, in turn, increases their incentives to commit such crimes. Here, this hypothesis is put to an empirical test focusing on a particular kind of crime, namely corruption. In order to test it, it was necessary to create an indicator measuring de jure as well as de facto independence of the prosecution agencies. The regressions show that de facto independence of prosecution agencies robustly reduces corruption of officials.

Keywords: Corruption, Prosecution Agencies, Judicial Independence, Prosecutorial Independence

JEL Classification: H11, K40, K42

Suggested Citation

van Aaken, Anne and Feld, Lars P. and Voigt, Stefan, Power Over Prosecutors Corrupts Politicians: Cross Country Evidence Using a New Indicator (March 2008). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 2245; MACIE Discussion Paper No. 0208; U. of St. Gallen Law & Economics Working Paper No. 2008-06. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1097675

Anne Van Aaken

University of St. Gallen - Law Department ( email )

Guisanstrasse 36
St. Gallen, CH-9010
Switzerland

HOME PAGE: http://www.unisg.ch/en/Schools/Law/Ueber+LS/Lehrstuehle/Lehrstuhl+van+Aaken/Professorin.aspx

Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ( email )

Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10
D-53113 Bonn, 53113
Germany

Lars P. Feld

Walter Eucken Institute ( email )

Goethestrasse 10
Freiburg im Breisgau, Baden-W├╝rttemberg D-79100
Germany

University of Freiburg - College of Economics and Behavioral Sciences ( email )

Freiburg, D-79085
Germany

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Stefan Voigt (Contact Author)

University of Hamburg - Institute of Law & Economics ( email )

Johnsallee 35
Hamburg, 20148
Germany
+49-40-428385782 (Phone)
+49-40-428386794 (Fax)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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