New Evidence on the Effectiveness of Foreign Exchange Market Intervention

Posted: 26 Feb 2008

See all articles by Kees C. G. Koedijk

Kees C. G. Koedijk

Tilburg University - Department of Finance

Bruce Mizrach

Rutgers University, Department of Economics

Philip A. Stork

Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, School of Business and Economics; Tinbergen Institute

Casper G. de Vries

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Economics (ESE); Tinbergen Institute; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

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Abstract

This paper compares foreign exchange market intervention in case there is no uncertainty about the extent of an imperfectly sustainable target zone and where there is uncertainty. A well-known example of the first case was the European Monetary System between 1979 and 1992. An example of the latter is the dirty floating of the dollar against the Dmark and yen after the so-called Louvre Accord in 1987. The analysis shows that the instantaneous effectiveness of intervention tends to be larger the more implicit the band policy is. our empirical results which use Belgian and US intervention data support this claim.

Keywords: official intervention, target zones

JEL Classification: F31, F33

Suggested Citation

Koedijk, Kees G. and Mizrach, Bruce and Stork, Philip A. and De Vries, Casper, New Evidence on the Effectiveness of Foreign Exchange Market Intervention. European Economic Review, Vol. 39, No. 3-4, 1995. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1097758

Kees G. Koedijk

Tilburg University - Department of Finance ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
+31 13 4663048 (Phone)
+31 13 4662052 (Fax)

Bruce Mizrach

Rutgers University, Department of Economics ( email )

75 Hamilton Street
New Brunswick, NJ 08901
United States
(848) 932-8636 (Phone)
(732) 932-7416 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://snde.rutgers.edu/

Philip A. Stork (Contact Author)

Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, School of Business and Economics ( email )

De Boelelaan 1105
Amsterdam, 1081HV
Netherlands

Tinbergen Institute ( email )

Gustav Mahlerplein 117
Amsterdam, 1082 MS
Netherlands

Casper De Vries

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) ( email )

P.O. Box 1738
3000 DR Rotterdam, NL 3062 PA
Netherlands
+31 10 408 8956 (Phone)
+31 10 408 9147 (Fax)

Tinbergen Institute

Burg. Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3062 PA
Netherlands
+31 10 408 8956 (Phone)
+31 10 408 9147 (Fax)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de

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