Incomplete Contracts with Asymmetric Information: Exclusive Versus Optional Remedies

Posted: 29 Feb 2008

See all articles by Ronen Avraham

Ronen Avraham

Tel Aviv University - Buchmann Faculty of Law; University of Texas at Austin - School of Law

Zhiyong (John) Liu

Indiana State University - Scott College of Business

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: 2006

Abstract

Scholars have been debating for years the comparative advantage of damages and specific performance. Yet, most work has compared a single remedy contract to another single remedy contract. But contract law provides the non-breaching party with a variety of optional remedies to choose from in case of a breach, and parties themselves regularly write contracts which provide such options. In this article, we start filling this gap by studying multi-remedy contracts. Specifically, we compare a contract that grants the non-breaching party an option to choose between liquidated damages and specific performance with an exclusive remedy contract, which restricts the non-breaching party's remedy to liquidated damages only.

Suggested Citation

Avraham, Ronen and Liu, Zhiyong (John), Incomplete Contracts with Asymmetric Information: Exclusive Versus Optional Remedies ( 2006). American Law and Economics Review, Vol. 8, Issue 3, pp. 523-561, 2006, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1097906 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/aler/ahl011

Ronen Avraham (Contact Author)

Tel Aviv University - Buchmann Faculty of Law ( email )

Ramat Aviv
Tel Aviv, 69978
Israel

University of Texas at Austin - School of Law ( email )

727 East Dean Keeton Street
Austin, TX 78705
United States
(512) 232-1357 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.utexas.edu/law/faculty/profile.php?id=ra22397

Zhiyong (John) Liu

Indiana State University - Scott College of Business ( email )

SCOB, Indiana State University
30 N 7th St.
Terre Haute, IN 47809
United States

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