Takeover Contests with Asymmetric Bidders

Posted: 29 Feb 2008

See all articles by Paul Povel

Paul Povel

University of Houston - Department of Finance, C.T. Bauer College of Business

Rajdeep Singh

University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Carlson School of Management

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Abstract

Target firms often face bidders that are not equally well informed, which reduces competition, because bidders with less information fear the winner's curse more. We analyze how targets should be sold in this situation. We show that a sequential procedure can extract the highest possible transaction price. The target first offers an exclusive deal to a better-informed bidder, without considering a less well-informed bidder. If rejected, the target offers either an exclusive deal to the less well-informed bidder, or a modified first-price auction. Deal protection devices can be used to enhance a target's commitment to the procedure. (JEL G34, K22, D44)

Suggested Citation

Povel, Paul and Singh, Rajdeep, Takeover Contests with Asymmetric Bidders. The Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 19, Issue 4, pp. 1399-1431, 2006, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1097949 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhj034

Paul Povel

University of Houston - Department of Finance, C.T. Bauer College of Business ( email )

University of Houston
334 Melcher Hall
Houston, TX 77204
United States
713-743-4759 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.bauer.uh.edu/povel

Rajdeep Singh

University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Carlson School of Management ( email )

19th Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States
612-624-1061 (Phone)
612-626-1335 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://umn.edu/~rajsingh

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