Gangs and Crime Deterrence

Posted: 29 Feb 2008

See all articles by Abdala Mansour

Abdala Mansour

Centre interuniversitaire sur le risque, les politiques économiques et l'emploi (CIRPÉE)

Nicolas Marceau

Centre Interuniversitaire sur le Risque, les Politiques Economiques et l'Emploi (CIRPEE)

Steeve Mongrain

Simon Fraser University (SFU) - Department of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 2006

Abstract

A framework is developed in which the formation of gangs-the criminal market structure-is endogenous. As in standard models of crime, under a given gang structure, an increase in deterrence reduces criminal output. However, under identifiable circumstances, an increase in deterrence can lead to an increase in the number of competing criminal gangs and to an increase in total illegal output, possibly accompanied with a fall in the price. We show that an increase in demand can also modify the criminal market structure and can ultimately affect the output and the price in a similar way.

Suggested Citation

Mansour, Abdala and Marceau, Nicolas and Mongrain, Steeve, Gangs and Crime Deterrence (October 2006). The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 22, Issue 2, pp. 315-339, 2006. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1098687 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewj015

Abdala Mansour (Contact Author)

Centre interuniversitaire sur le risque, les politiques économiques et l'emploi (CIRPÉE) ( email )

Ste-Foy, Quebec G1K 7P4
Canada

Nicolas Marceau

Centre Interuniversitaire sur le Risque, les Politiques Economiques et l'Emploi (CIRPEE) ( email )

Ste-Foy, Quebec G1K 7P4
Canada

Steeve Mongrain

Simon Fraser University (SFU) - Department of Economics ( email )

8888 University Drive
Burnaby, British Columbia V5A 1S6
Canada
604-291-3547 (Phone)
604-291-5944 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.sfu.ca/~mongrain/

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