The Deterrent and Displacement Effects of Information Security Enforcement: International Evidence

25 Pages Posted: 3 Mar 2008 Last revised: 28 Sep 2008

See all articles by Ivan P. L. Png

Ivan P. L. Png

National University of Singapore (NUS)

Chen-yu Wang

National University of Singapore (NUS) - School of Computing

Qiu-Hong Wang

National University of Singapore (NUS)

Date Written: April 21, 2008

Abstract

We adapt the event study methodology from research in financial economics to study the impact of government enforcement and economic opportunities on information security attacks. We found limited evidence that domestic enforcement deters attacks within the country. However, we found compelling evidence of a displacement effect: U.S. enforcement substantially increases attacks originating from other countries. We also found strong evidence that attackers are economically motivated in that the number of attacks is increasing in the U.S. unemployment rate. Our findings were robust to differences in the effective time window of enforcement, and measurement of vulnerabilities.

Keywords: Information security, attacks, enforcement, unemployment, economics

JEL Classification: A10, E24, G14, L86, K42

Suggested Citation

Png, Ivan P. L. and Wang, Chen-yu and Wang, Qiu-Hong, The Deterrent and Displacement Effects of Information Security Enforcement: International Evidence (April 21, 2008). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1099646 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1099646

Ivan P. L. Png

National University of Singapore (NUS) ( email )

Singapore, 117543
Singapore
+65 6516-6807 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/iplpng/

Chen-yu Wang

National University of Singapore (NUS) - School of Computing ( email )

3 Science Drive 2
Singapore 117543
Singapore

Qiu-Hong Wang (Contact Author)

National University of Singapore (NUS) ( email )

1E Kent Ridge Road
NUHS Tower Block Level 7
Singapore, 119228
Singapore

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
100
Abstract Views
1,354
Rank
509,477
PlumX Metrics