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The Market for Union Representation: An Information Deficit or Rational Behavior?

Harry G. Hutchison

Regent University - School of Law; Oxford Centre for the Study of Law & Public Policy

February 29, 2008

Virginia Law Review, Forthcoming
George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 08-12

In his forthcoming Virginia Law Review article, "Information and the Market for Union Representation", Professor Matthew Bodie asserts the NLRB's model fails to ensure the inclusion of sufficient relevant information. Offering a purchase of services paradigm as an alternative way to understand the decision to choose or refrain from choosing to join a union, Bodie conceives the representation election as a collective economic decision rather than the end result of a political campaign. In order for the market for union representation to function satisfactorily, adequate knowledge is required. Professor Bodie tenders a provisional solution - mandatory disclosure aimed at boosting public confidence in the market for union representation.

Although Professor Bodie's approach is a welcome addition to the literature, it suffers from a few shortcomings. First, labor unions have historically opposed transparency. They are unlikely to welcome additional disclosure initiatives. Second, his proposal appears to offer a constrained conception of capture that concentrates on employers. Public choice shows that the possibility of capture, grounded in self-interest, is not limited to employers. A more robust conception of capture would include union hierarchs and their ideological allies who see unions as a staging area for the achievement of ideological goals that few workers share. Third, Bodie's article offers a prevailing but contestable conception of free-riding that appears to overestimate the economic benefits that workers receive from unions. Lastly, Professor Bodie appears to underestimate the capacity of workers as autonomous and adaptive principals to acquire adequate information about the cost and benefits of unionization over a period of time. Even within the existing disclosure framework, workers respond to the information provided by the market, by choosing, or more likely by declining to choose union representation.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 9

Keywords: NLRB, National Labor Relations Act, union representation, labor market information, free-riding, Matthew Bodie, purchase of services, representation election, labor unions

JEL Classification: J50, J51, J53, J58, K31

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Date posted: March 5, 2008 ; Last revised: October 10, 2008

Suggested Citation

Hutchison, Harry G., The Market for Union Representation: An Information Deficit or Rational Behavior? (February 29, 2008). Virginia Law Review, Forthcoming; George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 08-12. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1100041

Contact Information

Harry G. Hutchison (Contact Author)
Regent University - School of Law ( email )
1000 Regent University Drive
Virginia Beach, VA 23464
United States
Oxford Centre for the Study of Law & Public Policy
Belsyre Court, 57 Woodstock Road
Oxford 0X2 6HJ
United Kingdom

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