Enforcement Aspects of Conservation Policies: Compensation Payments Versus Reserves

KULeuven FETEW Working Paper No. 2008-01

34 Pages Posted: 4 Mar 2008

Date Written: February 2008

Abstract

This model explicitly incorporates the dynamic aspects of conservation programs with incomplete compliance and it allows landholders' behavior to change over time. A distinction is made between initial and continuing compliance. We find that incomplete and instrument-specific enforcement can have a significant impact on the choice between subsidy schemes and reserves for conservation policies. The results suggest that it is useless to design a conservation scheme for landholders, if the regulator is not prepared to explicitly back the program with a monitoring and enforcement policy. In general, the regulator will prefer to use compensation payments, if the cost of using government revenues is sufficiently low, the environmental benefits are equal, and the cost efficiency benefits exceed the (possible) increase in inspection costs. If the use of government funds is too costly, the reserve-type instruments will be socially beneficial.

Keywords: Monitoring and enforcement, Policy instruments, Conservation policy

Suggested Citation

Rousseau, Sandra, Enforcement Aspects of Conservation Policies: Compensation Payments Versus Reserves (February 2008). KULeuven FETEW Working Paper No. 2008-01, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1101349 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1101349

Sandra Rousseau (Contact Author)

KU Leuven - Brussels Campus ( email )

Warmoesberg 26
Brussel, 1000
Belgium

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
57
Abstract Views
759
Rank
800,697
PlumX Metrics