Firm Volatility and Banks: Evidence from U.S. Banking Deregulation

42 Pages Posted: 6 Mar 2008

See all articles by Ricardo Correa

Ricardo Correa

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Gustavo Suarez

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Date Written: November 15, 2007

Abstract

This paper exploits the staggered timing of state-level banking deregulation in the U.S. during the 1980s to study the causal effect of banking integration on the volatility of non-financial corporations. We find that firm-level employment, production, sales, and cash flows are less volatile after interstate banking deregulation. The decrease in volatility is stronger for firms that have limited access to external finance, suggesting that bank-dependent firms exploit wider access to finance after deregulation to smooth out idiosyncratic shocks. In fact, short-term credit becomes less procyclical after out-of-state bank entry is permitted. Finally, lower volatility in real-side variables after deregulation translates into lower idiosyncratic risk in stock returns. If deregulation enhances efficiency in intermediation and promotes the development of the banking system, our results suggest that banking development may lower firm volatility in non-financial sectors.

Keywords: Volatility, bank regulation, external finance

JEL Classification: G21, G32

Suggested Citation

Correa, Ricardo and Suarez, Gustavo, Firm Volatility and Banks: Evidence from U.S. Banking Deregulation (November 15, 2007). AFA 2009 San Francisco Meetings Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1102297 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1102297

Ricardo Correa (Contact Author)

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System ( email )

20th Street and Constitution Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20551
United States

Gustavo Suarez

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System ( email )

20th Street and Constitution Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20551
United States

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