Payout Policies and Closed-end Fund Discounts: Signaling, Agency Costs, and the Role of Institutional Investors

52 Pages Posted: 6 Mar 2008 Last revised: 8 Aug 2011

Zhi Jay Wang

University of Oregon - Charles H. Lundquist School of Business

Vikram K. Nanda

University of Texas at Dallas - School of Management - Department of Finance & Managerial Economics

Date Written: February 1, 2011

Abstract

The adoption of a Managed Distribution Policy or Plan (MDP) by closed-end funds appears effective in dramatically reducing, even eliminating, fund discounts. We investigate two possible explanations: the signaling explanation proposed in the literature, that the MDP serves as a positive signal of future fund performance, and an alternative explanation based on agency costs. Our results indicate that signaling is, at best, only part of the explanation and that the evidence is generally more consistent with the agency cost hypothesis. For funds adopting aggressive payout targets of 10% (median target) and above, discounts tend to disappear, though there is no discernible improvement in NAV performance. Consistent with the agency cost hypothesis, it is often pressure from institutions/large shareholders that leads to the adoption of aggressive payout policies. Moreover, aggressive MDPs are associated with a decrease in fund size and managerial fees. Suggestive of their activist role in MDP adoptions and/or informed trading, institutions - especially ones that are Value oriented - tend to build up their holdings in a fund prior to the adoption of an aggressive MDP, and liquidate their positions once the price rises.

Keywords: Payout Policy, Closed-End Discount, Signaling, Agency Costs

JEL Classification: G23, G35

Suggested Citation

Wang, Zhi Jay and Nanda, Vikram K., Payout Policies and Closed-end Fund Discounts: Signaling, Agency Costs, and the Role of Institutional Investors (February 1, 2011). AFA 2009 San Francisco Meetings Paper. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1102715 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1102715

Zhi Jay Wang (Contact Author)

University of Oregon - Charles H. Lundquist School of Business ( email )

1208 University of Oregon
Eugene, OR 97403-1208
United States

Vikram K. Nanda

University of Texas at Dallas - School of Management - Department of Finance & Managerial Economics ( email )

2601 North Floyd Road
P.O. Box 830688
Richardson, TX 75083
United States

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