New Organisational Forms, Learning and Incentives-Based Inequality

International Journal of Manpower, Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 83-97

Posted: 9 Mar 2008 Last revised: 11 Dec 2013

See all articles by Patricia Crifo

Patricia Crifo

Ecole Polytechnique, Paris - Laboratoire d'Econometrie; Université Paris X Nanterre - Department of Economics; Center for Interuniversity Research and Analysis on Organization (CIRANO)

Marie Claire Villeval

Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), CNRS; IZA Institute of Labor Economics; Global Labor Organization (GLO)

Date Written: 2001

Abstract

In relation to the analysis of inequality and skill-bias innovation, this article develops a theoretical model for determining the influence of work organisation on incentives and earnings. In a linear agency model, which explains innovative work organisation practices from an incentive perspective, we show that the static impact of organisational forms on expected earnings can be decomposed into two effects (a risk premium effect and a task complementarity effect originated in learning and information diffusion). Such effects drive productivity and expected pay-offs upward, as observed in many recent empirical studies. Thus, the development of new work practices based on a greater degree of delegation contributes to the increase of earnings inequality. In a dynamic perspective, the model shows that knowledge dissemination will in general sustain the same trend. However, when initial efforts and productivity are relatively high, output and pay-offs will decline during the transition to the steady-state. The overall impact of organisational forms on earnings and inequality may therefore be ambiguous, depending on the importance of learning.

Keywords: Incentives, Job design, Learning

JEL Classification: J2, J3, M5

Suggested Citation

Crifo, Patricia and Villeval, Marie Claire, New Organisational Forms, Learning and Incentives-Based Inequality (2001). International Journal of Manpower, Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 83-97. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1103109

Patricia Crifo (Contact Author)

Ecole Polytechnique, Paris - Laboratoire d'Econometrie ( email )

Route de Saclay
Palaiseau, 91128
France

Université Paris X Nanterre - Department of Economics

Nanterre Cedex, 92001
France

Center for Interuniversity Research and Analysis on Organization (CIRANO)

2020 rue University, 25th floor
Montreal H3C 3J7, Quebec
Canada

Marie Claire Villeval

Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), CNRS ( email )

93, chemin des Mouilles
Ecully, 69130
France
+33 472 86 60 79 (Phone)
+33 472 86 60 90 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.gate.cnrs.fr/equipe/perso/villeval/villeval.html

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Global Labor Organization (GLO) ( email )

Collogne
Germany

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