Decentralization as a Disincentive for Transnational Terror? An Empirical Test

31 Pages Posted: 11 Mar 2008 Last revised: 4 Jun 2008

See all articles by Axel Dreher

Axel Dreher

Heidelberg University

Justina A. V. Fischer

Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD); Stockholm School of Economics; University of Hohenheim

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Date Written: March 2008

Abstract

Using panel data for a maximum of 109 countries over the years 1976-2000, we empirically analyze the impact of decentralization on the occurrence of transnational terror. Taking account of the potential simultaneity between terror and decentralization, our results show that expenditure decentralization robustly reduces the number of terror events in a country, while political decentralization has no impact.

Keywords: Terrorism, Decentralization, Democracy

JEL Classification: D74, H70, H40

Suggested Citation

Dreher, Axel and Fischer, Justina A.V., Decentralization as a Disincentive for Transnational Terror? An Empirical Test (March 2008). U. of St. Gallen Law & Economics Working Paper No. 2008-05. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1103817 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1103817

Axel Dreher (Contact Author)

Heidelberg University ( email )

Grabengasse 1
Heidelberg, 69117
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.axel-dreher.de

Justina A.V. Fischer

Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) ( email )

2 rue Andre Pascal
Paris Cedex 16, 75775
France

Stockholm School of Economics

PO Box 6501
Stockholm, 11383
Sweden

University of Hohenheim

Fruwirthstr. 48
Stuttgart, 70599
Germany

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