Tax Competition: Greenfield Investment Versus Mergers and Acquisitions

33 Pages Posted: 11 Mar 2008

See all articles by Johannes Becker

Johannes Becker

University of Cologne

Clemens Fuest

ifo Institute – Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich; Ludwig-Maximilians-University, Munich; Center for Economic Studies (CES)

Date Written: March 2008

Abstract

In this paper, we analyze tax competition in a model where investor firms have the choice between two types of investment, greenfield investment and mergers and acquisitions. We show that the coexistence of these two types of investment intensifies tax competition in comparison to the case where there is only greenfield investment. If a specific tax on acquisitions is available, this result changes. Then, tax competition is mitigated compared to the pure greenfield case. The existence of an acquisition tax may even lead to corporate overtaxation.

Keywords: corporate taxation, mergers and acquisitions, tax competition

JEL Classification: H25, F23

Suggested Citation

Becker, Johannes and Fuest, Clemens, Tax Competition: Greenfield Investment Versus Mergers and Acquisitions (March 2008). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 2247. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1104951

Johannes Becker

University of Cologne ( email )

Albertus-Magnus-Platz
Cologne, 50923
Germany

Clemens Fuest (Contact Author)

ifo Institute – Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE 81679
Germany
++89-9224-1430 (Phone)

Ludwig-Maximilians-University, Munich ( email )

Schackstrasse 4 / II
Munich, DE 80539
Germany

Center for Economic Studies (CES) ( email )

Schackstr. 4
Munich, DE 80539
Germany
++89 2180-2748 (Phone)
++89 2180-17845 (Fax)

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