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Costly Screens and Patent Examination

48 Pages Posted: 12 Mar 2008 Last revised: 24 Feb 2011

Jonathan S. Masur

University of Chicago - Law School

Date Written: July 1, 2008

Abstract

The United States Patent and Trademark Office has acquired a well-deserved reputation for inefficacy and inefficiency. Proposals for reforming the patent office have thus focused on improving the quality of patent review while decreasing its cost. Yet this view overlooks the valuable function performed by the high costs associated with obtaining a patent: these costs serve as an effective screen against low-value patents. Moreover, due to asymmetries in patent values, the costly screen is likely to select against socially harmful patents in disproportionate numbers. Although the patent office is the most prominent forum in which this type of costly screening operates, it is not the only one. In a variety of other contexts, the private costs of navigating an administrative process may complement the process itself in screening out unwanted participants.

Keywords: patent, PTO, examination, administrative, procedure, costly screen, costly signal, environmental permitting, immigration, landlord, tenant

Suggested Citation

Masur, Jonathan S., Costly Screens and Patent Examination (July 1, 2008). The Journal of Legal Analysis, Vol. 2, No. 2, Winter 2011; U of Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 393; U of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 205. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1105184

Jonathan S. Masur (Contact Author)

University of Chicago - Law School ( email )

1111 E. 60th St.
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773.702.5188 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/masur/

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