A Demandeur-Centric Approach to Regime Design in Transnational Commercial Law

46 Pages Posted: 12 Mar 2008 Last revised: 11 Oct 2015

See all articles by Sandeep Gopalan

Sandeep Gopalan

Deakin University, Geelong, Australia - Deakin Law School

Date Written: March 11, 2008

Abstract

Recent scholarship on international agreement design has almost exclusively focused on the public international law area. The literature on regime design in the area of international private law lacks a solid theoretical foundation. Academic writing on public international law's state-centric approach is only amenable to crude transplantation and poses several puzzles in the international private law context. Resolving these puzzles is important because of the proliferation of transnational commercial agreements in areas that were traditionally the province of domestic law. This paper attempts to provide a starting point to address the theoretical vacuum. Part I argues that functionalist, liberal, and realist theories cannot fully explain transnational commercial law agreement design. Part II puts forth a demandeur-centric approach with the aid of examples that span the spectrum from hard law to soft law. Part III concludes that agreement design in transnational commercial law is premised on demandeur preferences and relative power.

Keywords: transnational commercial law, international law, ICC, UNIDROIT, UNCITRAL, Hague conference, incoterms, arbitration, international relations, aircraft finance, securities

JEL Classification: K00, K33, L33, N40, O19, P26

Suggested Citation

Gopalan, Sandeep, A Demandeur-Centric Approach to Regime Design in Transnational Commercial Law (March 11, 2008). Georgetown Journal of International Law, Vol. 39, 2008. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1105225

Sandeep Gopalan (Contact Author)

Deakin University, Geelong, Australia - Deakin Law School ( email )

221 Burwood Highway
Burwood
Burwood, Victoria 3125, Victoria 3125
Australia

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