Changing Contract Lenses: Unexpected Supervening Events in English, New Zealand, U.S., Japanese, and International Sales Law and Practice

43 Pages Posted: 12 Mar 2008 Last revised: 8 Jul 2008

See all articles by Luke R. Nottage

Luke R. Nottage

The University of Sydney - Faculty of Law; The University of Sydney - Australian Network for Japanese Law; University of Wollongong

Abstract

This article compares differences in the reasoning underlying contractual relationships between (more formal) English and New Zealand law versus (more substantive) U.S. and Japanese law. It builds upon the framework proposed by Atiyah and Summers by adding the notion of "didactic formality" to identify another important contrast between the laws of these countries. In more formal systems, as in England and New Zealand, stronger didactic formality involves the "law in books" trying to dictate or direct the "law in action", rather than vice versa. The article also discusses how CISG (the UN Sales Convention) and UPICC (UNIDROIT Principles) fit in to this spectrum. The article therefore concludes by questioning "strong convergence" theory in commercial law worldwide.

Keywords: contract law and practice, comparative law, Japanese Law, Anglo-Commonwealth law

JEL Classification: K10, K12, K30

Suggested Citation

Nottage, Luke R., Changing Contract Lenses: Unexpected Supervening Events in English, New Zealand, U.S., Japanese, and International Sales Law and Practice. Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 385-418, 2007, Sydney Law School Research Paper No. 08/25, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1105240

Luke R. Nottage (Contact Author)

The University of Sydney - Faculty of Law ( email )

New Law Building, F10
The University of Sydney
Sydney, NSW 2006
Australia

The University of Sydney - Australian Network for Japanese Law

Room 640, Building F10, Eastern Avenue
Sydney, NSW 2006
Australia

University of Wollongong ( email )

Northfields Avenue
Wollongong, New South Wales 2522
Australia

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