Press Coverage and Political Accountability

48 Pages Posted: 19 Mar 2008 Last revised: 4 Dec 2022

See all articles by James M. Snyder

James M. Snyder

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Political Science & Department of Economics

David Strömberg

Stockholm University - Institute for International Economic Studies (IIES); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Date Written: March 2008

Abstract

In this paper we estimate the impact of press coverage on citizen knowledge, politicians' actions, and policy. We find that a poor fit between newspaper markets and political districts reduces press coverage of politics. We use variation in this fit due to redistricting to identify the effects of reduced coverage. Exploring the links in the causal chain of media effects -- voter information, politicians' actions and policy -- we find statistically significant and substantively important effects. Voters living in areas with less coverage of their U.S. House representative are less likely to recall their representative's name, and less able to describe and rate them. Congressmen who are less covered by the local press work less for their constituencies: they are less likely to stand witness before congressional hearings, to serve on constituency-oriented committees (perhaps), and to vote against the party line. Finally, this congressional behavior affects policy. Federal spending is lower in areas where there is less press coverage of the local members of congress.

Suggested Citation

Snyder, James M. and Strömberg, David, Press Coverage and Political Accountability (March 2008). NBER Working Paper No. w13878, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1106604

James M. Snyder (Contact Author)

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Political Science & Department of Economics ( email )

E53-457
Cambridge, MA 02139
United States
617-253-2669 (Phone)

David Strömberg

Stockholm University - Institute for International Economic Studies (IIES) ( email )

Stockholm, SE-10691
Sweden
+46 816 4376 (Phone)
+46 816 1443 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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