What is Missed If We Leave Out Collective Choice in the Analysis of Taxation

Posted: 25 Aug 1998

See all articles by Stanley L. Winer

Stanley L. Winer

Carleton University - School of Public Policy and Administration; Carleton University - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Walter Hettich

California State University, Fullerton - Department of Economics

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Abstract

Omission of collective choice prevents the analyst from understanding the central role of political equilibrium. To create a framework that places tax policies in a broader equilibrium context, we must model the underlying collective allocation mechanism and use it as a starting point, whether we do empirical work explaining observed features of tax systems, or whether we engage in research on tax efficiency. A broader perspective of this nature also forces us to re-examine well-known concepts, such as tax expenditures, flat taxation and the marginal efficiency cost of public funds, and to question and re-interpret some of the conclusions that have been reached in the literature related to these concepts.

JEL Classification: D7, H1, H2, H3

Suggested Citation

Winer, Stanley L. and Hettich, Walter, What is Missed If We Leave Out Collective Choice in the Analysis of Taxation. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=110768

Stanley L. Winer (Contact Author)

Carleton University - School of Public Policy and Administration ( email )

1125 Colonel By Drive
Ottawa, Ontario K1S 5B6
Canada
613-520-2600 x2630 (Phone)
613-520-2551 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.carleton.ca/winer

Carleton University - Department of Economics ( email )

1125 Colonel By Drive
Ottawa, Ontario K1S 5B6
Canada
613-520-2600 ex.2630 (Phone)
613-520-2551 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.carleton.ca/winer

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Walter Hettich

California State University, Fullerton - Department of Economics ( email )

Fullerton, CA 92834
United States

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