Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Empirical Analysis

65 Pages Posted: 20 Mar 2008  

H. Jay Folberg

University of San Francisco - School of Law

Joshua D. Rosenberg

University of San Francisco School of Law

Date Written: 1994

Abstract

Many analysts and courts have made alternative dispute resolution (ADR) a key feature of proposals for civil justice reform. The authors served as advisors to a task force, which commissioned a study of the ADR program in the Northern District of California. This article presents the authors' extensive findings and recommendations. During the four-year study period, the district used an ADR process called "early neutral evaluation" (ENE), to which half of the cases in certain types of suits were assigned.

Two-thirds of those assigned to ENE were satisfied with the process and believed it was worth the resources devoted to it; half of those assigned to ENE saved money, with average savings exceeding ten times the cost of an ENE session; and about half of the cases in which ENE sessions were held were resolved more quickly than cases not assigned to the ENE program. Despite the fact that over 80 percent of attorneys assigned to ENE reported that they would select ENE in other cases, no one whose case was not automatically assigned to ENE asked to have the case assigned, even though that option was available and known. The key predictors of a successful ENE outcome were the attitude and skills of the neutral evaluator. A number of the authors' recommendations in this article thus focus on selecting and retaining effective neutrals.

Keywords: Alternative Dispute Resolution, California courts, Early Neutral Evaluation, Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990

Suggested Citation

Folberg, H. Jay and Rosenberg, Joshua D., Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Empirical Analysis (1994). Stanford Law Review, Vol. 46, p. 1487, 1994. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1108319

H. Jay Folberg

University of San Francisco - School of Law ( email )

2130 Fulton Street
San Francisco, CA 94117
United States

Joshua D. Rosenberg (Contact Author)

University of San Francisco School of Law ( email )

2130 Fulton Street
San Francisco, CA 94117
United States

Paper statistics

Downloads
397
Rank
58,847
Abstract Views
1,666