Posted: 19 Mar 2008 Last revised: 23 Nov 2015
Date Written: July 2012
We use the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) as a natural experiment of a shock to internal governance to examine the link between product market competition and internal governance mechanisms. Consistent with the notion that product market competition is a close substitute for internal governance, we find that firms in concentrated industries experienced a larger improvement in operational efficiency after the approval of SOX than did firms in non-concentrated industries. These gains in efficiency appear to come from a significant reduction in production and administrative costs. Several robustness tests confirm that our main results are not driven by unobservable factors unrelated to changes in corporate governance.
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Chhaochharia, Vidhi and Grullon, Gustavo and Grinstein, Yaniv and Michaely, Roni, Product Market Competition and Agency Conflicts: Evidence from the Sarbanes Oxley Act (July 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1109225 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1109225