Negotiating for Better or Worse: Changing Pie Sizes Affect Negotiation Relationships

14 Pages Posted: 23 Mar 2008

See all articles by Jimena Ramírez-Marín

Jimena Ramírez-Marín

University of Amsterdam

Francisco J. Medina

University of Seville - Department of Social Psychology

Wolfgang Steinel

Leiden University - Social and Organizational Psychology

Date Written: 2007

Abstract

How do parties in ongoing repeated negotiation relationships react to changing circumstances? We argue that situations that become more beneficial (i.e. offer potentially higher outcomes to both) can affect negotiators´ relationships in two distinct ways. On the one hand, negotiators may see improving circumstances as more to share, which should lead to increased trust. On the other hand, negotiators may see it as more to fight about, which should decrease trust. We argue that social motivation (i.e., negotiators having a prosocial or pro-self motivation) may be a moderator, and explore this research question in a five-week repeated role-play negotiation experiment (N = 208). Contrary to our predictions, trust tended to increase in increasing and in decreasing sequences, maybe because participants did not recognize decreasing sequences as such. Implications for future research are discussed.

Suggested Citation

Ramírez-Marín, Jimena and Medina Díaz, Francisco José and Steinel, Wolfgang, Negotiating for Better or Worse: Changing Pie Sizes Affect Negotiation Relationships (2007). IACM 2007 Meetings Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1111634 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1111634

Jimena Ramírez-Marín (Contact Author)

University of Amsterdam ( email )

Spui 21
Amsterdam, 1018 WB
Netherlands

Francisco José Medina Díaz

University of Seville - Department of Social Psychology ( email )

Camilo Jose Cela s/n
Sevilla, 41018
Spain

Wolfgang Steinel

Leiden University - Social and Organizational Psychology ( email )

Leiden, 2300 RA
Netherlands

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
98
Abstract Views
947
rank
330,408
PlumX Metrics