Do Markets Respond to Quality Information? The Case of Fertility Clinics

32 Pages Posted: 21 Mar 2008 Last revised: 13 Jun 2022

See all articles by Kate Bundorf

Kate Bundorf

Duke University; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Natalie Chun

Asian Development Bank

Gopi Shah Goda

Stanford University

Daniel P. Kessler

Stanford Graduate School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: March 2008

Abstract

Although policymakers have increasingly turned to provider report cards as a tool to improve health care quality, existing studies provide mixed evidence that they influence consumer choices. We examine the effects of providing consumers with quality information in the context of fertility clinics providing Assisted Reproductive Therapies (ART). We report three main findings. First, clinics with higher birthrates had larger market shares after relative to before the adoption of report cards. Second, clinics with a disproportionate share of young, relatively easy-to-treat patients had lower market shares after adoption versus before. This suggests that consumers take into account information on patient mix when evaluating clinic outcomes. Third, report cards had larger effects on consumers and clinics from states with ART insurance coverage mandates. We conclude that quality report cards have potential to influence provider behavior in this setting.

Suggested Citation

Bundorf, Kate and Chun, Natalie and Goda, Gopi Shah and Kessler, Daniel Philip, Do Markets Respond to Quality Information? The Case of Fertility Clinics (March 2008). NBER Working Paper No. w13888, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1111981

Kate Bundorf (Contact Author)

Duke University

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Natalie Chun

Asian Development Bank ( email )

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Gopi Shah Goda

Stanford University ( email )

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Daniel Philip Kessler

Stanford Graduate School of Business ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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