The Economic Theory of Nuisance Law and Implications for Environmental Regulation

28 Pages Posted: 24 Mar 2008 Last revised: 15 May 2008

Keith N. Hylton

Boston University - School of Law

Abstract

I explore the economic structure of nuisance law as a mechanism for regulating environmental interferences and propose a modernized enforcement regime. The modern regime would retain public enforcement primarily in identifying environmental harms and as a backstop for private enforcement.

Keywords: economic structure of nuisance law, nuisance law, environmental regulation, command and control rules, liability rules, public enforcement, private enforcement, decentralization inefficiencies, agency cost problems, cost-benefit balancing of the common law

JEL Classification: K00, K13, K32, K41

Suggested Citation

Hylton, Keith N., The Economic Theory of Nuisance Law and Implications for Environmental Regulation. Case Western Reserve Law Review, 2008; Boston Univ. School of Law Working Paper No. 08-13. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1112631

Keith N. Hylton (Contact Author)

Boston University - School of Law ( email )

765 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215
United States
617-353-8959 (Phone)
617-353-3077 (Fax)

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