An Economic Assessment of EC Merger Control: 1957-2007
CCP Working Paper No. 08-17
58 Pages Posted: 31 Mar 2008
Date Written: March 2008
Abstract
This paper provides an assessment of EC merger policy from three perspectives. First, it places the evolution of merger policy alongside the evolution of economic ideas in relation to competition and industrial organisation. Second, it highlights recent developments in the practical economic appraisal of competition in four areas: unilateral (non-coordinated) effects, particularly the appropriate use of simulation techniques and the efficiency defence; coordinated effects (collective dominance), particularly the role of the Community Courts; non-horizontal effects, particularly the need for the new guidelines; and remedies, particularly weaknesses in current practice. Third, it develops a simple bargaining approach to merger policy evaluation to draw conclusions about the trend in overall effectiveness of EC merger policy since 1989.
Keywords: merger control, unilateral effects, collective dominance, remedies, merger policy
JEL Classification: C78, K21, L41
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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