The Role of Contribution Among Defendants in Private Antitrust Litigation
CCP Working Paper No. 08-3
32 Pages Posted: 31 Mar 2008
Date Written: February 2008
To date the experience of the incidence of private actions for damages in antitrust cases has differed markedly across jurisdictions. The procedural rules surrounding private litigation may account for some of these differences. This paper explores the effect of rules concerning contribution among multiple defendants who are joint and severally liable for a cartel infringement. The no-contribution rule is shown to lead to higher levels of aggregate damages and more information revelation to the private plaintiff. However, the no-contribution rule also has the potential to neuter any public leniency programme, thereby possibly reducing the number of cartels detected.
Keywords: cartels, leniency, private damages
JEL Classification: K21, K42, L40
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation