The Role of Contribution Among Defendants in Private Antitrust Litigation

CCP Working Paper No. 08-3

32 Pages Posted: 31 Mar 2008

See all articles by Morten Hviid

Morten Hviid

University of East Anglia - Centre for Competition Policy (CCP); University of East Anglia (UEA) - Norwich Law School

Andrei Medvedev

Government of the United Kingdom - Financial Services Authority

Date Written: February 2008

Abstract

To date the experience of the incidence of private actions for damages in antitrust cases has differed markedly across jurisdictions. The procedural rules surrounding private litigation may account for some of these differences. This paper explores the effect of rules concerning contribution among multiple defendants who are joint and severally liable for a cartel infringement. The no-contribution rule is shown to lead to higher levels of aggregate damages and more information revelation to the private plaintiff. However, the no-contribution rule also has the potential to neuter any public leniency programme, thereby possibly reducing the number of cartels detected.

Keywords: cartels, leniency, private damages

JEL Classification: K21, K42, L40

Suggested Citation

Hviid, Morten and Medvedev, Andrei, The Role of Contribution Among Defendants in Private Antitrust Litigation (February 2008). CCP Working Paper No. 08-3, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1114134 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1114134

Morten Hviid (Contact Author)

University of East Anglia - Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) ( email )

UEA
Norwich Research Park
Norwich, Norfolk NR47TJ
United Kingdom

University of East Anglia (UEA) - Norwich Law School ( email )

Norwich NR4 7TJ, Norfolk
United Kingdom

Andrei Medvedev

Government of the United Kingdom - Financial Services Authority ( email )

25 The North Colonnade
Canary Wharf
London E14 5HS
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://andrei-medvedev.blogspot.co.uk/

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