Outsourcing and Optimal Nonlinear Taxation: A Note

14 Pages Posted: 1 Apr 2008

See all articles by Thomas Aronsson

Thomas Aronsson

University of Umea - Department of Economics; Uppsala University

Erkki Koskela

University of Helsinki - Department of Political and Economic Studies; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Bank of Finland - Research Department; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Date Written: April 2008

Abstract

This paper addresses outsourcing in the two-type optimal income tax model. If the government is able to control outsourcing via a direct tax instrument, outsourcing will not affect the marginal income tax structure. In the absence of a direct tax instrument, and under the plausible assumption that higher outsourcing increases the wage differential, the government will implement a lower marginal income tax rate for the low-ability type and a higher marginal income tax rate for the high-ability type than it would otherwise have done.

Keywords: outsourcing, optimal nonlinear taxation

JEL Classification: H21, H25, J31, J62

Suggested Citation

Aronsson, Thomas and Koskela, Erkki, Outsourcing and Optimal Nonlinear Taxation: A Note (April 2008). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 2269. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1114754

Thomas Aronsson

University of Umea - Department of Economics ( email )

Umeå University
Umea, SE - 90187
Sweden

Uppsala University

Box 513
Uppsala, 751 20
Sweden

Erkki Koskela (Contact Author)

University of Helsinki - Department of Political and Economic Studies ( email )

P.O. Box 54
FIN-00014 Helsinki
Finland
+358 9 191 8894 (Phone)
+358 9 191 8877 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.cesifo.de/servlet/page?_pageid=56&_dad=portal30&_schema=PORTAL30&pa_id=7298

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de

Bank of Finland - Research Department ( email )

P.O. Box 160
FIN-00101 Helsinki
Finland

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

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