Settlement

124 Pages Posted: 2 Apr 2008

See all articles by Andrew F. Daughety

Andrew F. Daughety

Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University; Vanderbilt University - Law School

Jennifer F. Reinganum

Vanderbilt University - College of Arts and Science - Department of Economics; Vanderbilt University - Law School

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 2008

Abstract

This survey of the modeling of pretrial settlement bargaining organizes current main themes and recent developments. The basic concepts used are outlined as core models and then several variations on these core models are discussed. The focus is on articles that emphasize formal models of settlement negotiation and the presentation in the survey is organized in game-theoretic terms, this now being the principal tool employed by analyses in this area, but the discussion is aimed at the not-terribly-technical non-specialist. The survey also illustrates some of the basic notions and assumptions of information economics and of (cooperative and noncooperative) game theory.

Keywords: Settlement, Bargaining, Negotiation, Litigation

JEL Classification: K41, C70

Suggested Citation

Daughety, Andrew F. and Reinganum, Jennifer F., Settlement (March 2008). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1115299 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1115299

Andrew F. Daughety (Contact Author)

Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://my.vanderbilt.edu/andrewdaughety/

Vanderbilt University - Law School

131 21st Avenue South
Nashville, TN 37203-1181
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Jennifer F. Reinganum

Vanderbilt University - College of Arts and Science - Department of Economics ( email )

Box 1819 Station B
Nashville, TN 37235
United States
615-322-2937 (Phone)
615-343-8495 (Fax)

Vanderbilt University - Law School

131 21st Avenue South
Nashville, TN 37203-1181
United States

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