Economic Growth and Institutional Reform in Modern Monarchies and Republics: A Historical Cross-Country Perspective 1820-2000

41 Pages Posted: 2 Apr 2008

See all articles by Christian Bjørnskov

Christian Bjørnskov

Aarhus University - Department of Economics and Business; Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN); Center for Political Studies; Institute for Corruption Studies

Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard

University of Copenhagen

Date Written: January 15, 2008

Abstract

Standard theoretical arguments suggest that republics ought to grow faster than monarchies and experience lower transitional costs following reforms. We employ a panel of 27 countries observed from 1820-2000 to explore whether regime types and institutional reforms have differential growth effects in monarchies and republics. A set of Barro-type regressions show that there are no significant growth differences between the two regime types and that the effects of incremental reforms do not differ between them, but that those of large-scale reforms do. Specifically, we find a strong "valley-of-tears" effect of large reforms in republics while monarchies benefit from such reforms in the ten-year perspective adopted here. We offer some tentative thoughts on the underlying mechanisms responsible for the results.

Keywords: Growth, Institutions, Reform, Monarchy

JEL Classification: D72, N00, O10, P14, P16, P17, P48, P51

Suggested Citation

Bjørnskov, Christian and Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter, Economic Growth and Institutional Reform in Modern Monarchies and Republics: A Historical Cross-Country Perspective 1820-2000 (January 15, 2008). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1115313 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1115313

Christian Bjørnskov (Contact Author)

Aarhus University - Department of Economics and Business ( email )

Fuglesangs Allé 4
Aarhus V, DK-8210
Denmark

Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN) ( email )

Box 55665
Grevgatan 34, 2nd floor
Stockholm, SE-102 15
Sweden

Center for Political Studies

Landgreven 3
Copenhagen K, DK-1301
Denmark

Institute for Corruption Studies

Stevenson Hall 425
Normal, IL 61790-4200
United States

Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard

University of Copenhagen ( email )

Dept. of Political Science
Øster Farimagsgade 5, P.O.Box 2099
Copenhagen, DK-1014
Denmark
+45 35 32 37 98 (Phone)
+45 35 32 33 99 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.kurrild-klitgaard.net

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