Country Specific Institutional Effects on Ownership Concentration and Performance of Continental European Firms

Abstract

This paper examines the effect of country-specific institutional constructs on the relationship between ownership concentration and performance for firms in the eight Continental European countries of Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal. Using data from publically-traded firms owned by other companies (i.e., blocks) measures of the quality of investor and creditor protection and the effectiveness of legal institutions are applied. Employing a hierarchical moderated multiple regression analysis differential validity is established for the relationship between ownership concentration and performance as measured by return on shareholders' funds. This differential effect comes from creditor protection regimes and is consistent with a relational corporate governance model based on debt finance and concentrated ownership.

Keywords: ownership concentration, country-specific institutional effects, differential effects, creditors' and investors' protection regimes, legality, corporate governance

JEL Classification: M4