Top Executive Turnovers: Separating Decision and Control Rights

Managerial and Decision Economics, Vol. 26, No. 1, pp. 25-37, January/February 2005

Posted: 3 Apr 2008

See all articles by Robert Neumann

Robert Neumann

Danske Bank - Danske Markets

Torben Voetmann

The Brattle Group; University of San Francisco

Abstract

This paper examines the relationship between performance and top executive turnovers using a sample of 81 turnovers and matching companies listed on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange. We find that poor market performance increases the probability of management replacements and that forced layoffs are value-increasing events while voluntary resignations are value-decreasing events. Large shareholders as active monitors, or part of corporate control, are not exhibited in the results. If large shareholders have any influence on CEO turnovers it is not revealed in our data. Indeed, separating control rights from decision rights does not appear to affect managerial turnovers.

Keywords: CEO Turnovers, Corporate Governance, Ownership Structure

JEL Classification: G14. G23, G32

Suggested Citation

Neumann, Robert and Voetmann, Torben, Top Executive Turnovers: Separating Decision and Control Rights. Managerial and Decision Economics, Vol. 26, No. 1, pp. 25-37, January/February 2005. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1115905

Robert Neumann

Danske Bank - Danske Markets ( email )

Holmens Kanal 2-12
DK-1092 Copenhagen K
Denmark

Torben Voetmann (Contact Author)

The Brattle Group ( email )

201 Mission Street
Suite 2800
San Francisco, CA 94105
United States
415-217-1000 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.brattle.com

University of San Francisco ( email )

2130 Fulton Street
San Francisco, CA 94117
United States

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