Deception Through Telling the Truth?! Experimental Evidence from Individuals and Teams

Economic Journal, Forthcoming

University of Innsbruck Working Paper No. 2007-26

28 Pages Posted: 16 Sep 2008

See all articles by Matthias Sutter

Matthias Sutter

Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods; University of Cologne - Department of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: 2007

Abstract

Informational asymmetries abound in economic decision making and often provide an incentive for deception through telling a lie or misrepresenting information. In this paper I use a cheap-talk sender-receiver experiment to show that telling the truth should be classified as deception too if the sender chooses the true message with the expectation that the receiver will not follow the sender's (true) message. The experimental data reveal a large degree of 'sophisticated' deception through telling the truth. The robustness of my broader definition of deception is confirmed in an experimental treatment where teams make decisions.

Keywords: Deception, Expectations, Team decision making, Individual decision making, Experiment

JEL Classification: C72, C91, D82

Suggested Citation

Sutter, Matthias, Deception Through Telling the Truth?! Experimental Evidence from Individuals and Teams (2007). Economic Journal, Forthcoming; University of Innsbruck Working Paper No. 2007-26. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1116224

Matthias Sutter (Contact Author)

Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ( email )

Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10
D-53113 Bonn, 53113
Germany

University of Cologne - Department of Economics

Cologne, 50923
Germany

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