Performance Measurement under Rational International Overpromising Regimes

40 Pages Posted: 7 Apr 2008

Date Written: April 2, 2008


Overpromising remains ingrained in international agreements, clouding their expected aggregate outcomes and how to assess the Parties' performance. This paper provides a theory-based explanation and evaluation of this regime and its consequences, with an empirical application to the Kyoto Protocol. It shows (1) overpromising to be part of a sustainable strategy for electoral success, and (2) there are common determinants of the countries' overpromising values that characterize the group regime. (3) Targets need to be adjusted for regression-predicted overpromising to yield rationally-expected outcomes. (4) Individual countries' performance is best identified by deviations of outcomes from their adjusted, not the agreed, targets.

Keywords: Overpromising, international agreements, treaty compliance, performance measurement, politics and environment, Kyoto Protocol

JEL Classification: F53, Q54, D72

Suggested Citation

von Furstenberg, George M., Performance Measurement under Rational International Overpromising Regimes (April 2, 2008). CAEPR Working Paper No. 2008-005. Available at SSRN: or

Center for Applied Economics And Policy Research (Contact Author)

Indiana University Bloomington - Department of Economics

Wylie Hall
Bloomington, IN 47405-6620
United States

George M. Von Furstenberg

Indiana University ( email )

Department of Economics
Wylie Hall, Indiana University
Bloomington, IN 47405-6620
United States
812-856-1382 (Phone)
812-855-3736 (Fax)


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