Corporate Risk and Shareholder Value - Research Report

19 Pages Posted: 8 Apr 2008

See all articles by Krzysztof Waśniewski

Krzysztof Waśniewski

Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski Krakow University

Date Written: March 29, 2008

Abstract

In order for the capital market to grow sustainably and to be relatively crisis-proof corporate governance has to reduce asymmetric information among shareholders and to allow their accurate reaction to firms' fundamental changes. A preliminary research conducted on a small sample of firms (n = 4) and introducing to a broader study of a more numerous sample (n = 80 - 100), opened on two paradigms of corporate governance. The first one, more frequently practiced as it seems, displays important asymmetric information, high transaction costs, high anticipated agency costs, relatively high corporate risk, relatively low long-term shareholders' value and leads investors to underestimate operational risk and market risk as firm's fundamentals. The second one, seemingly less frequent, is the opposite: low asymmetry of information, low transaction costs, low anticipated agency costs, relatively low corporate risk, relatively high long-term shareholders' value, leading investors to an accurate evaluation of operational risk and market risk as firm's fundamentals.

Keywords: corporate risk, shareholder value, corporate governance, operational risk

JEL Classification: G30, G32, G34

Suggested Citation

Waśniewski, Krzysztof, Corporate Risk and Shareholder Value - Research Report (March 29, 2008). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1117247 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1117247

Krzysztof Waśniewski (Contact Author)

Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski Krakow University ( email )

ul. Herlinga Grudzińskiego 1
Kraków
Poland

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