A Social Network Analysis of Occupational Segregation

45 Pages Posted: 23 Apr 2008

See all articles by Marco van der Leij

Marco van der Leij

CeNDEF, University of Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute; De Nederlandsche Bank - Research Department

Sebastian Buhai

Stockholm University - Swedish Institute for Social Research (SOFI)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 1, 2008

Abstract

We develop a social network model of occupational segregation between different social groups, generated by the existence of positive inbreeding bias among individuals from the same group. If network referrals are important for job search, then expected homophily in the contact network structure induces different career choices for individuals from different social groups. This further translates into stable occupational segregation equilibria in the labor market. We derive the conditions for wage and unemployment inequality in the segregation equilibria and characterize first and second best social welfare optima. Surprisingly, we find that socially optimal policies involve segregation.

Keywords: Social Networks, Homophily, Inbreeding Bias, Occupational Segregation, Labor Market Inequality, Social Welfare

JEL Classification: J24, J31, J70, Z13

Suggested Citation

van der Leij, Marco Juri and Buhai, Ioan-Sebastian, A Social Network Analysis of Occupational Segregation (March 1, 2008). FEEM Working Paper No. 31.2008. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1117949 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1117949

Marco Juri van der Leij (Contact Author)

CeNDEF, University of Amsterdam ( email )

Roetersstraat 11
Amsterdam, NL-1018WB
Netherlands
+31 20 525 7356 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://home.staff.uva.nl/m.j.vanderleij

Tinbergen Institute ( email )

Burg. Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3062 PA
Netherlands

De Nederlandsche Bank - Research Department ( email )

P.O. Box 98
1000 AB Amsterdam
Netherlands

Ioan-Sebastian Buhai

Stockholm University - Swedish Institute for Social Research (SOFI) ( email )

Kyrkgatan 43B
SE-106 91 Stockholm
Sweden

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